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Was there a “British” Empire?
The Oxford History of the British Empire
from a Canadian Perspective
AS LATE AS THE 1960S BRITISH IMPERIAL HISTORY was still studied in a
tradition best exemplified in The Cambridge History of the British Empire, published
in nine volumes between 1929 and 1940.1 The editors of the Cambridge History
emphasized in the preface to the first volume that the history of the Empire had been
a “long story of colonisation and imperial policy, of the rise and growth of new
nations and the assumption of vast responsibilities”.2 The focus of the Cambridge
History was on the second British Empire – only one of the three general volumes was
devoted to the pre-1783 Empire – and on the gradual transformation of the colonies
of settlement into self-governing Dominions. India was obviously central to the
Imperial story and so was given separate treatment in two volumes. But the history of
the rest of what was defined as the “dependent empire” was incorporated in the three
general volumes, while each of the Dominions – Canada, Australia, New Zealand and
South Africa – was given a separate volume of its own. The volumes on the
Dominions were all collaborative efforts involving scholars from the Dominions and
reflecting the belief that the British Commonwealth was a partnership of Britons at
home and Britons abroad. Indeed, Sir Charles Lucas declared that “If anything
absolutely new can be traced to the possession of our Empire, it must be traced to the
most original feature in it, the progressive development of dependencies into
independent partner nations which have nevertheless remained by the mother
country’s side and under the same sovereign”. Somewhat overoptimistically in
retrospect, he proclaimed that “the life of Great Britain as a nation is now, as it was
not formerly, conditioned by its partnership” with the Dominions.3 This argument
was especially appealing to Canadian scholars who believed that it had been “the
protracted ferment in both the Canadas, the strenuous efforts of reformers in Nova
Scotia, and the unanswerable arguments of Lord Durham” which had forced Imperial
statesmen to follow “the true line of advance” after the American Revolution and to
concede to the colonies of settlement in the second British Empire self-government
through the device of responsible government. W.P.M. Kennedy proudly proclaimed
that the transformation of the British Empire into the British Commonwealth had
resulted “largely from the bold progressiveness of Canadian statesmen”.4
The new five-volume Oxford History of the British Empire, over 3,000 pages in
length and divided into nearly 150 chapters, is the first multi-authored, multi-volume
history since the Cambridge History and it shows how completely the scholarly study
1 I have borrowed (but modified) the title of this article from Ged Martin’s stimulating  “Was there a
British Empire?”, Historical Journal, 15 (1972), pp. 562-9.
2 Preface to volume one of The Cambridge History of the British Empire (Cambridge, 1929), p. v.
3 Ibid., pp. 20-1.
4 Ibid., vol. 6, pp. v-vi.
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of imperial history has altered.5 There are a host of ways in which the Oxford History
differs from the Cambridge but three seem to me to be of particular importance. First,
the assumption that there was something distinctive about the British Empire has been
largely abandoned. The British Empire appears different from the other European
Empires only in its size and longevity. It is seen not as a liberal and progressive force
implanting British parliamentary institutions around the globe, but as the expression
of a typically rapacious European power extending economic and political control,
both formal and informal, over the less developed parts of the world. In volume one
N.A.M. Rodgers declares that “If empire, as Francis Xavier said, was little more than
‘to conjugate the verb to rob in all its moods and tenses’,” the English were the “purest
of imperialists” (I, pp. 96-7). Very early in its history, Nicholas Canny declares, the
empire came to be justified in Britain on the basis of “its contribution to the economic
well being” of the mother country and religious and other motivations were clearly
subordinated to the material (I, p. 22). This theme runs through all four of the
narrative volumes of the Oxford History. I do not mean to imply that the authors fall
into some simple economic reductionist theory. They recognize that imperial
expansion from the 17th to the 20th century was driven by a host of economic and
non-economic factors – by European rivalries, by missionary enthusiasm, by a desire
to find an outlet for Britain’s rapidly growing population, by scientific curiosity and
technological imperatives, by military calculations and needs, and sometimes by
simple accident. Nonetheless, one comes away from the Oxford History with the
impression that the Empire was essentially an instrument for adding to the wealth of
Great Britain.
The question of how much of a benefit – or a liability – the Empire actually was is
specifically dealt with in several chapters. In volume two Patrick K. O’Brien
challenges the argument that the first Empire “made only a small contribution to the
rise of the first industrial nation” (II, p. 75) and Jacob Price concludes that, at the very
least, the demand created by the overseas empire hastened the technological
transformation of several long-established branches of British industrial life (II, p.
99). In volume three Avner Offer dismisses as unlikely the frequently heard argument
that the Empire was a diversion “from a more productive development path” in which
more equipment and talent would have been invested in the domestic economy (III, p.
708). In volume four D.K. Fieldhouse concludes that “it remains quite unclear how
Britain might have prospered without her Imperial crutches after 1914”  (IV, pp. 112-
13). On balance then the Empire is seen as a positive force in the development of the
British economy and a benefit to Britain.
The second major theme of the Oxford History is the extent to which the British
Empire interacted with and affected the lives of the various non-British peoples who
were brought under British rule. In the Cambridge History the British Empire was
5 The five volumes are: Nicholas Canny, ed., The Oxford History of the British Empire: Volume I: The
Origins of Empire (Oxford, 1998); P.J. Marshall, ed., The Oxford History of the British Empire:
Volume II: The Eighteenth Century (Oxford, 1998); Andrew Porter, ed., The Oxford History of the
British Empire: Volume III: The Nineteenth Century (Oxford, 1999); Judith M. Brown and Wm.
Roger Louis, eds., The Oxford History of the British Empire: Volume IV: The Twentieth Century
(Oxford, 1999); Robin W. Winks, ed., The Oxford History of the British Empire: Volume V:
Historiography (Oxford, 1999). All page references in the text are to this source.
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seen as at worst a benign, and usually a beneficial force promoting good government
and modernization around the globe. In the first British Empire, which was
concentrated in North America, the British saw themselves “as a commercial and
agricultural rather than conquering people” (I, p. 37). They stressed the “peaceful
origins” of their Empire (I, p. 51). Even during the 19th century they saw themselves
as reluctant imperialists responding to turbulent frontiers and ultimately as a force
bringing positive good to the areas of the world which were reluctantly added to the
Empire. These hoary myths are now firmly laid to rest. Here too the Oxford History
is very balanced. It rejects the myth that the English were inherently more racist than
other Europeans. The first Englishmen to have “direct dealings with Amerindians”
were, Nicholas Canny insists,  “sympathetic towards Native Americans and their
culture” and they “made as genuine an effort as any Europeans to overcome their
inherited beliefs and prejudices and accommodate America and its peoples within
their world view” (I, pp. 152-3). But the British ultimately posed a greater threat to
the Native Americans because they came in substantially larger numbers than other
Europeans and they were “concerned with securing rights not over peoples but over
land” (I, p. 37).
One of the great strengths of the Oxford History, one of the many ways in which it
is far superior to the Cambridge History, is that it treats the Native Americans not
merely as victims but as historical actors interacting with the British. The Native
Americans were not, Peter C. Mansell point out, “meek witnesses to European
colonization”; some resisted the European invaders, others sought to negotiate with
the newcomers, “creating commercial and diplomatic alliances that preserved much
of their world” (I, p. 346). During the first half of the 18th century the surviving
Amerindian groups in and around the Thirteen Colonies “secured fragile places in a
global imperial system” (II, p. 347), but they were again caught up in the wars
between France, Britain and America which shook the continent between the Seven
Years War and the War of 1812-14, when the British abandoned their Indian allies
and left them “to make the best terms they could with the United States” (II, p. 369).
In the 19th century the Native peoples in Canada, the Aborigines in Australia and the
Maoris in New Zealand, despite the so-called doctrine of imperial trusteeship, were
similarly forced to make the best terms they could with the British settlers in those
colonies, though their story is not told nearly so effectively in the Oxford History,
buried as it is as a very minor sub-theme in the brief chapters on 19th- and 20th-
century Canada, Australia and New Zealand.
In other respects too the Oxford History presents a more critical picture of the
British record. The Cambridge History pointed with pride to Britain being one of the
first nations to abolish the slave trade and slavery, ignoring evidence that the British
had carried more slaves across the Atlantic than any other power and that nowhere had
conditions for slaves been harsher than in the British West Indies. The Oxford History
presents a truer picture. David Richardson stresses the harmful effect of the trade “on
the social and political fabric of Africa” during the century and a half when the British
dominated the trade (II, p. 463). The majority of Blacks “lived short and impoverished
lives, worked most of the time, created fragile families, encountered great brutality”,
but Philip D. Morgan warns against painting “a monochrome caricature” of the Black
experience (II, p. 485). Blacks also resisted “the dehumanization inherent in their
status”, sometimes by rebellion or by “flight, sabotage, and individual murders”. The
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greatest act of resistance was the creation of “a distinctive language, music, and
religion – in short, a culture” – though this had the ambiguous result of encouraging
accommodation to the established order (II, p. 483). In the end it was humanitarian
pressure which led to the abolition of the slave trade but, as J.R. Ward points out, by
this time the British no longer believed  “that they were making a significant
economic sacrifice” (II, p. 428). Similarly, as Andrew Porter argues, the pressure to
abolish slavery may have come from the humanitarians but until they were able to add
“a ‘capitalist’ argument” to their armory, emancipation was unlikely (III, p. 204).
During the 19th century the British gradually brought under imperial rule ever
larger numbers of non-British peoples. In India but also elsewhere in Asia and Africa
the indigenous populations were so large or so powerful that they could not simply be
ignored and shoved aside. The British were therefore forced to find collaborators from
among the native rulers and/or elites and frequently they were also forced to adjust
imperial policies to avoid widespread resistance from those they had brought under
imperial rule. Once again the Oxford History insists on the wide variety of responses
of non-British peoples to the expansion of Empire: from collaboration to various
forms of resistance, both active and passive. Colonial Indian history, D.A. Washbrook
points out, can not “be reduced to a simple dialectic of domination and resistance”
(III, p. 397). Similarly, the  “cultural encounters between Briton and African during
the late-19th-century conquest, even where violence was involved, were on both
sides”, according to T.C McCaskie, “matters of probing negotiation towards the
equilibrium of a changed order rather than permanently binding choices between
strategies of outright collaboration or resistance” (III, p. 679). In the 20th century the
British increasingly sought their collaborators from among the more reactionary
elements in Africa and Asia and, through the policy of indirect rule, sought to “slow
and control the pace of change”, a policy which John Cell condemns as “inefficient
and unprogressive” and ultimately unsuccessful (IV, pp. 251, 242).
The Colonial Office occasionally interfered to prevent the abuse of power in
colonies with substantial European minorities, but only after World War Two did it
begin to play a really active role in trying to provide better educational facilities and
social services in the so-called dependent empire. Increasingly the main concern of
British officials was to provide the infrastructure for the creation of a viable
independent state so that they could leave with dignity. Yet, as B.R. Tomlinson points
out, despite the rhetoric of imperial trusteeship, “British rule did not leave a
substantial legacy of wealth, health, or happiness to the majority” of their ex-colonial
territories in Asia and Africa (IV, p. 375).
A third major difference between the Cambridge and the Oxford History is in their
attitude toward those who resided at the heart of the Empire. The Cambridge History
took as a given that the British people – itself a problematic construct for much of this
period – were born to the purple, born to acquire a vast and extensive empire. The
Oxford History stresses the slow growth of the Empire and the complex impact that
its acquisition had on British culture.  Jane Ohlmeyer argues that even before they had
an empire, the English had developed “ethnocentric mentalities” as they established
their control over Ireland and over the Borders, the Highlands and the Islands (I, p.
147). Indeed, until the 1630s, Nicholas Canny asserts, “the English plantations in
America hardly impinged upon the consciousness of most English people” (I, p. 164).
Ireland – consistently treated in the Oxford History not as part of the United Kingdom,
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even when it was, but as the first British colony – remained of greater interest and
attracted more English migration and investment. Gradually the number of migrants
increased, as more and more men and women sought to be participants “in a rich and
expansive transatlantic world” (I, p. 191) and slowly the British did begin to evolve a
“comprehensive imperial ideology” (I, p. 113). By the 1760s, Peter J. Marshall
concludes, there had developed “a deep national commitment to Empire as an integral
part of Britain’s power and standing in the world and of British people’s sense of who
they were” (II, p. 26).
This commitment survived the loss of the Thirteen Colonies, but it was always
contested terrain. In the 19th century, the Empire was “a constant source of
celebration and self-regard – as well as anxiety –” to the British, one which “produced
much cultural common ground” but which also “stimulated intense controversy” (III,
p. 292). A number of the authors seem concerned to show that the Empire was never
as popular as it appeared. Ronald Hyam indicates that it was not popular in the
Edwardian era, though his evidence is drawn largely from a few anecdotal comments
made by Colonial Office officials and disillusioned ex-governors. In volume four a
whole chapter is devoted to “Critics of Empire in Britain” in the 20th century and
Nicholas Owen describes “most workers” as “indifferent or apathetic to questions of
Empire” (IV, p. 198), despite his own evidence seeming to contradict this conclusion.
It is also contradicted by John Mackenzie who talks about an “Indian Summer in the
popular culture of Empire” (IV, p. 229). Mackenzie notes that “one of the curiosities
of British Imperial history” appears to be that “when the Empire encountered the
economic, political, and constitutional crises that would ultimately bring it down,
British domestic culture came to emphasize colonial relationships as never before”
(IV, p. 230).
Now I have no quarrel with these themes per se. They are a necessary corrective to
the romanticized, triumphalist, Whiggish version of Imperial History embodied in the
Cambridge History and I have little sympathy with those who do not like the Oxford
History because its authors adopted a far more critical and less sympathetic view of
the legacies of Empire than they wanted. Ironically the editors of the Oxford History
are also likely to be attacked by proponents of colonial discourse theory for not being
critical enough of the British record and for being too traditional in their approach.6 It
is undoubtedly true that most of those involved in the writing of the Oxford History
were fairly traditional historians. But if one takes that as a given, what they have
produced in a relatively short period of time is a survey which is breathtaking in its
sweep and which effectively incorporates the scholarship of a whole generation of
imperial historians. There are a few topics which one might like to have seen explored
in greater depth. The most obvious weakness is in the treatment of gender issues. The
6 See, for example, Dane Kennedy, “The Boundaries of Oxford’s Empire”, International History
Review, 23, 3 (September 2001), pp. 604-22. Not surprisingly, Kennedy, who believes area studies
are no longer especially useful, has limited sympathy with my argument. Kennedy chaired the Round
Table panel on the Oxford History held at the annual meeting of the American Historical Association
in January 2000 at which I presented a draft of this paper. For an approach somewhat closer to my
own, see Andrew Thompson, “Is Humpty Dumpty Together Again?”, Twentieth Century British
History, 12, 4 (2001), pp. 9-23. I am grateful to both Kennedy and Thompson for reading and
commenting on an earlier draft of this paper.
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only volume to contain a chapter specifically on “Gender in the British Empire” is the
20th-century volume. In volume five on “Historiography” Diana Wylie had to
incorporate gender into a chapter on “Disease, Diet and Gender” (an interesting
combination). Actually the volume on historiography is a rather strange beast. It
contains a discussion of several topics, such as that on “Architecture in the British
Empire”, which are not really historiographical articles at all, but discussions of topics
which somehow got left out or received insufficient attention in the earlier volumes.
But this is a minor criticism. At least they are there and what the Oxford History does,
it does very well indeed.
My criticism is of a rather different nature. I would not deny that the Cambridge
History placed far too much emphasis on the significance of the Dominions and that
it was necessary to broaden out the story to include the whole Empire. Nor would I
deny the need to move beyond constitutional history and to focus on the interaction
between the British and the non-British peoples brought under imperial control. But
revisionism always carries with it the danger of throwing out the baby with the
bathwater and I would argue that that is what the Oxford History has done. In its desire
to move away from constitutional issues, to focus on the impact of European
expansion in Africa and Asia, and to incorporate into the story those parts of the world
sometimes described as part of Britain’s “informal empire”, something important has
been lost sight of. That something is the critical significance to the British imperial
experience of the colonies of settlement. The Cambridge History took as a given that
there were two empires, an empire of British settlement which had by 1940 evolved
into a series of “partner nations”, and a “dependent empire”. The latter consisted of
territories in which indigenous peoples would forever form the majority. The former
consisted of a small club (at this stage including Ireland and South Africa as well as
Canada, Australia and New Zealand), which alongside Britain formed the inner,
privileged core – the “British” component – of the larger British Empire. This division
is implicitly rejected by the editors and authors of the Oxford History. Indeed, there
seems to be a deliberate attempt to play down the significance of the “British”
component in the British Empire. 
Actually this criticism does not really apply to the two volumes dealing with the
pre-1783 Empire. How could it since the heart of the first empire was the American
colonies? As Nicholas Canny notes, the British Empire was “distinctive . . .  within
the spectrum of European overseas Empires” during the 17th and 18th centuries
because of “the prominent place enjoyed by colonies of white settlement within it” (I,
p. 15). The first two volumes of the Oxford History are very much an Anglo-American
collaborative effort.  Out of nine volumes the Cambridge History devoted one general
volume to the period before 1783 and a few chapters in some of the other nine
volumes. The Oxford History gives almost equal weight to the first and second British
Empires (though admittedly the two volumes devoted to the second empire are
substantially longer than the two volumes devoted to the first). This means inevitably
that the first two volumes can cover their topics in far greater detail and with far
greater sophistication than the writers in the later volumes when the Empire was so
much larger. In volume one, seven of the 21 chapters focus primarily (and several
others partly) on the British side of the Atlantic and two additional chapters are
devoted to Ireland. Every conceivable theme is covered and there is even room for a
chapter on “The Emerging Empire: The Continental Perspective, 1650-1713”, which
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examines Britain’s European rivals in the 17th century. Although one chapter is
devoted to the Caribbean (which might be seen as a considerable underemphasis), one
to the British “in” Western Africa (which, as even the author admits, on I, pp. 260-1,
can hardly be seen as part of the Empire since the British presence consisted simply
of a series of transient trading posts), and one to the British “in” Asia, most of the
remaining chapters focus on the plantations in America. The areas in North America
occupied by British colonists in the 17th century were very small in extent and grew
very slowly. Even in 1700 European settlement had barely begun to move into the
interior of the continent and both the Chesapeake and New England each included
only around 90,000 Europeans, while the Middle Colonies held fewer than half that
number and the Carolinas probably fewer than 15,000. Nonetheless, each of these four
regions is the subject of a separate chapter and the authors are able to produce detailed
and sophisticated portraits of imperial expansion in these regions. Even at this early
stage, before Scotland became part of the United Kingdom, the growing diversity of
population meant that “the adjective ‘English’ was no longer adequate to describe the
emerging Empire and ‘British’ came gradually to be accepted as a more serviceable
term” (I, p. 24). Indeed, the Irish, the Scots and the Welsh overseas quickly learned
that the “the readiest means of procuring for themselves the customary or putative
rights of Englishmen was to insist that they were British”. This insistence, Nicholas
Canny argues, “explains the alacrity with which ordinary white settlers in almost all
the Atlantic colonies took up arms to defend their rights” and their reaction to the
Glorious Revolution, which “demonstrated the existence of a British Empire whose
inhabitants shared political assumptions as well as economic interests” (I, p. 25). A
“British” Empire was already coming into existence.
These themes are further developed in the volume on The Eighteenth Century.
Considerable  attention is still paid to developments in Britain, two chapters are
devoted to the West Indies, two to the slave trade and slavery, two to events in Asia,
and even one to the Pacific. But inevitably the core of the volume focuses on the
American colonies and the American Revolution. This was a period of rapid
demographic growth in British America, fuelled partly by immigration. In the 17th
century about 400,000 migrants crossed the Atlantic to America, about 350,000 of
them from England and Wales. In the 18th century, the number of English declined to
under 100,000 while the number of Irish increased to 115,000 and of Scots to 75,000
(II, pp. 30-1). They were joined by large numbers of German-speaking peoples, as
well as smaller numbers from other parts of Europe. “All along the expanding
frontier”, James Horn notes, “Irish, German, Swiss, Highland Scots, English, and
Welsh settlers, together with African slaves and local Indian tribes, evolved as locally
distinct societies, where ethnic diversity and the continual movement of people in and
out were taken for granted” (II, p. 90). 
This may have been true along the frontier, but as volume two shows, the British
still formed the dominant group and they determined the social and political culture
of the Thirteen Colonies. Jack Greene points out that the long series of wars between
1689 and 1815 helped to create a stronger sense of British national identity in Britain.
Although in Britain this identity may have rested in large part on a shared
Protestantism among the Irish, the Welsh and the Scots, this association was not such
a decisive element in shaping colonial British identities (except perhaps in New
England). But other presumed British characteristics, Greene insists, could be and
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were transferred to the Thirteen Colonies. Particularly important was the belief that
“liberty was the most important ingredient of an Imperial identity in Britain and the
British Empire”, a belief that was still a component of the overseas British identity in
the 19th and 20th centuries (II, pp. 228-30). Over time there was a growing divide
between how the British elite at home and the British elites overseas defined their
British-ness. Even in Britain the terms “‘Britons’ and ‘Britannia’ emerged as symbols
of a patriotism less focused on the monarch than earlier”; in the colonies, Ian Steele
notes, there was an even clearer distinction between “the symbolically useful
monarch” and the ministers of the crown (a distinction critical to what later became
known as responsible government) (II, pp. 114-15). The Empire was able to function,
despite friction between the centre and the periphery, primarily because the Imperial
government left political, economic and social control within the colonies in the hands
of “the British communities of the Atlantic Empire” (II, p. 126). From this perspective
the American Revolution was indeed a civil war (which was how contemporaries
viewed it) between two branches of an extended British family, who could not agree
on how to reconcile the supremacy of the Imperial Parliament with the demands for
internal self-government in the “British” colonies overseas. This interpretation will
not satisfy all American colonial historians, especially those who see the revolution as
rooted in social conflict in the colonies. Ironically it would have satisfied the authors
of the Cambridge History and an earlier generation of Canadian historians who saw
the rupture between Britain and the Thirteen Colonies as a constitutional crisis which
developed because of a failure on the part of the Imperial authorities to accept that the
British colonies overseas must be allowed to run their own internal affairs and that the
Empire must involve into a federation of equals (or at least near equals).
Unfortunately modern-day Canadian historians are not much interested in these
constitutional issues. They will, nonetheless, be disappointed in the slight attention
paid to what would become Canada in the first two volumes of the Oxford History.
Both volumes were written by American and British scholars whose interest in and
knowledge of Canada was extremely limited. Of the 44 authors involved only Ian K.
Steele is based in Canada and has written extensively on Canadian history. Thus the
Canadian aspects of the American story tend to be overlooked or underemphasized.
Take for example the almost total lack of interest in the history of Newfoundland,
which has always claimed to be Britain’s oldest colony and which certainly in the 17th
and 18th centuries was more important to Britain in strategic and economic terms than
a number of the Thirteen Colonies. There are a few passing references to the colony
but no systematic discussion of the Island’s importance to the Empire, an importance
so great that the negotiations with France leading to the Treaty of Paris in 1763 almost
broke down over the issue of fishing rights off Newfoundland. Nor is there any real
discussion of the important links between Newfoundland and the West of England
and Ireland and the unique pattern of settlement that resulted from these linkages. And
the Beothuks, one of the first Amerindian groups to have sustained contact with the
English and one of the first to disappear, might as well never have existed as far as the
Oxford History is concerned. Similarly, while a whole chapter in volume one is
devoted to the Royal African Company’s limited and transient impact upon West
Africa, only a few passing references are made in volumes one to three to the
Hudson’s Bay Company, which ultimately secured British possession over an
enormous part of the North America continent and dramatically affected the lives of
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the native peoples of North America.
The mainland colonies in what became Canada could not be so easily ignored. But
readers of the Oxford History will not learn of the failed attempt to create a New
Scotland in the 17th century in what would later become Nova Scotia. They will not
understand from the few oblique references why Nova Scotia was the site of continual
conflict between rival Empires in the 17th century, conflicts which led in the 18th
century to the decision of the French to build the largest military base in the New
World and to the expulsion of the Acadians. The latter – surely one of the most brutal
acts in imperial history and the subject of a very substantial literature – is dealt with
in passing in two brief references. One reason for the expulsion was that the British
had long been engaged in a prolonged war with the Micmacs of Nova Scotia, but the
readers of the Oxford History will not learn this because they will not know the
Micmacs existed. On the map on page 355 of volume two on “Indian Peoples and
European Colonies in the Mid-Eighteenth Century” the Micmacs are left out and there
is no indication that they still controlled large parts of Nova Scotia. In the article on
“The British North American Empire” in volume five of the Oxford History, which
deals with historiography, Stephen Foster declares that “beginning in 1927 with New
England’s Outpost, John Bartlett Brebner at Columbia University made colonial
history a little more imperial by bringing the Maritimes into the study of the subject.
They have retained a toehold ever since, if only because Nova Scotia remains a useful
counter-example when explaining why the other thirteen colonies chose revolution”
(V, pp. 80-1). (Actually there were 14 other mainland colonies since Quebec by this
stage was also part of the Empire.) I fear it was not much of a toehold since Nova
Scotia’s reaction to the American Revolution is discussed in two lines in volume three
(p. 380) and the issues raised by Brebner, Bumsted, Rawlyk and Reid, all of whom
are cited by Foster in a footnote, are ignored. There is a reference in Peter Marshall’s
bibliography to the recent pre-Confederation history of Atlantic Canada, which
focuses heavily on imperial issues, but little evidence of its use by any of the
contributors.7 But then, as Foster points out, Brebner was “Canadian by birth and
earlier education, as for the most part were those who succeeded in his interests” 
(V, p. 81).
Quebec fares a little better than Nova Scotia but Canadian historians will be
disappointed with the brief and superficial discussion of the impact and long-term
implications of the Conquest, the most important event in Canadian history and surely
one of the most important in British imperial history. Canadian historians will also be
astonished by how little attention is paid to the Loyalists in the Thirteen Colonies.
Even their numbers are minimized and there is only the briefest discussion of their re-
settlement in what was left of the British Empire in North America after 1783.
Canadian historians will be astonished but hardly surprised since American historians
– and apparently present-day Imperial historians also – have never been much
interested in the losers. The bitter divisions among the Loyalists who migrated to
British North America are glossed over and the issue of the long-term contribution of
Loyalist ideology to the formation of a distinctive Canadian identity ignored. Indian
7 See Phillip A. Buckner and John G. Reid , eds., The Atlantic Region to Confederation: A History
(Toronto, 1994).
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Loyalists fare somewhat better and considerable attention is paid to their role in the
wars between Britain and the Americans between 1774 and 1815, though thereafter
the complex reactions of the native peoples of Canada to the extension of imperial
authority are dealt with very briefly and superficially. In effect, they have been
dispossessed both of their land and of their place in imperial history. The Black
loyalists fare worst of all. Their role in founding both Nova Scotia and Sierra Leone
is ignored.
A few years ago I heard a prominent American historian begin a paper by saying:
“After the British lost their empire in North America in 1783 . . .”! One might almost
believe this from reading the Oxford History. After 1783 it was not necessarily
inevitable that America would expand across the continent to occupy the territorial
limits that it does today and completely dominate the North American continent. But
the Oxford History is written as if it were. There is no real discussion of the efforts of
the British to prevent American expansion over the half century after 1783, either in
volume two or volume three, and so the significance of the British North American
Colonies and the importance of Canada to the Empire is marginalized.
In the 19th- and 20th-century volumes Canada is relegated to the sidelines as a
minor player. The comparison with the treatment given to the small British colonies
in North America in the 17th-century volume reveals a ludicrous disparity. In 1800
the British North American colonies were already much larger in extent and contained
more than twice the population of the American colonies in 1700 but they are given
only one chapter in the 18th-century volume compared to the four given to the
American colonies in the earlier volume. But Peter Marshall, who wrote the chapter
on “British North America, 1760-1815”, had a manageable task compared to the
authors of the later volumes.8 During the 19th century, Canada would spread across
the continent to become the world’s second largest country and by 1914 it had a
population of around eight million. Yet Ged Martin was given the same amount of
space to write about Canada from 1815-1914 as each of the four authors dealing with
early settlement in the Thirteen Colonies. Is it surprising that the chapters in volume
one are splendid overviews while Martin’s chapter inevitably has the feel of being a
once over lightly account? In the 20th -century volume, the chapter on Canada is
actually more satisfying because David Mackenzie abandons the effort to write a
comprehensive history of Canada in favour of a more limited study of “Canada, the
North Atlantic Triangle and the Empire”.
I do not want to be misunderstood here. When I gave an earlier version of this
paper at the annual meeting of the American Historical Association in Chicago, the
immediate assumption of the other panelists and (I suspect of the American audience)
was that I was simply a parochial Canadian historian selfishly demanding that greater
attention be paid to Canada. To an extent that may be true but I think it is legitimate
to query the inherent imbalance that exists in the Oxford History. American history is
privileged, perhaps reflecting the generous subsidies Americans gave to the project.
American scholars and American scholarship were fully incorporated into the project
as Dominions scholars and scholarship were in the Cambridge History but are not in
8 Perhaps to avoid confusion, it should be pointed out that Peter J. Marshall and Peter Marshall are
different people.
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the Oxford History. I say Dominions because what is true of Canadian history is also
true of Australian and New Zealand history.
Volumes one and two of the Oxford History of the British Empire were an Anglo-
American collaborative effort. Volumes three and four are largely a British enterprise.
Of the 26 contributors in volume three, 20 received their doctorates from Oxford,
Cambridge or London (and one from Aberdeen). Of the 28 contributors in volume
four, 20 did their graduate training in Oxford, Cambridge or London (and one in St.
Andrews). The dominance of Oxford is especially noticeable, even if not particularly
surprising. John MacKenzie, who contributes a chapter to both volumes, completed
his Ph.D. at the University of British Columbia, but I do not think he considers
himself a Canadian and he is not based in Canada. Peter Burroughs taught Imperial
history for many years at Dalhousie and Ged Martin has written extensively on
Canada, but as Doug Owram points out they are Canadian neither by birth nor by
adoption (V, p. 158). Robert Kubicek teaches at the University of British Columbia,
but his primary research interest has never been in Canadian history. Only David
MacKenzie in volume four and Doug Owram in volume five are historians educated
in, based in and primarily interested in Canada. Indeed, most of the academics
involved in the preparation of volumes three and four of the Oxford History trained in
Britain and have spent all or most of their academic careers in Britain. They
frequently present papers to each other at the imperial history seminars in Oxford,
Cambridge and London, and regularly contribute articles and reviews to the Journal
of Imperial and Commonwealth History. This British dominance had some
advantages. Part of the strength of volumes three and four in the Oxford History
derives from the fact that they are the product of a group of scholars well aware of
each other’s work and with a very similar set of beliefs about how imperial history
should be written, even if they disagree over some of the details. But it is hardly
surprising that this core of scholars, overwhelmingly trained and based in Britain,
view the Empire very much from a metropolitan perspective. I do not know how many
of them studied under Robinson or Gallagher but, as Roger Louis indicates in his
chapter on Imperial historiography in volume five, Robinson and Gallagher were
clearly the dominant influence on this generation of British-trained and largely
British-based imperial historians. By challenging the assumption that imperial
expansion was driven solely by events within Europe and insisting that the history of
British Imperialism must be seen as an interaction between the British and indigenous
peoples (V, p. 40), Robinson and Gallagher had a decisive and very positive impact
on the way in which imperial history was and is written. But in two other respects their
influence was more questionable, perhaps even pernicious.
It was Vincent Harlow who originally suggested that after the Seven Years’ War
there was a shift in the Empire’s centre of gravity to the East, but it was Robinson and
Gallagher who shifted the attention of Imperial historians towards Africa and Asia in
the 19th century. In his epilogue to the volume on the 18th century Peter Marshall
argues that Harlow may have placed the shift to the East too early but that clearly the
19th-century British Empire had become “predominantly an eastern one” (II, p. 591).
Andrew Porter picks up this theme in his introduction to volume three. I accept that
there is a case for this argument. But I do not think it is as clear-cut as they imply,
because I am far from certain that the question of an Eastern and a Western Empire is
the real issue. The more important division, it seems to me, is between the colonies of
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settlement where the indigenous peoples were dispossessed and the British (or at least
Europeans) came to form a majority of the population and those in which the
indigenous people, though temporarily brought under imperial rule, continued to form
the majority of the population and would eventually regain control of the colonial
state. The former were part of what can be called the “British” Empire; the latter
merely possessions of it. This was a division which was institutionalized
constitutionally in the 19th century and which was critical to the way the British
thought about their empire. Australia and New Zealand may have been in the East but
they were part of the “British” Empire. South Africa’s position was more ambiguous,
but while it may have been part of Africa, at least until well into the 20th century it
was seen as part of the “British” Empire. It was to the “British” Empire that British
emigrants flowed in the 19th and the 20th century. Indeed, Avner Offer makes the
point that it was “the overseas English-speaking societies” which were the major
benefit of empire to the British people since they opened up opportunities to British
migrants which otherwise would have been denied them (III, pp. 709-10). If one looks
at periodicals or at the popular press, the amount of attention given to the “British”
colonies always far outweighed the attention given to the colonies in Africa and Asia,
except during brief periods of crisis like the Indian Rebellion of 1857. It was events
in Canada which created the most problems for successive British governments from
the 1830s to the 1860s and preoccupied British colonial and foreign secretaries,
though you will not learn this from reading the Oxford History. Even in economic
terms the Dominions were more significant collectively, if not individually, to Britain
than any other part of the Empire, including India, and they would become more so in
the 20th century.
Head-counting may lead one to conclude that the British Empire was based in Asia
and Africa by the end of the 19th century, but the British did not count all heads as
equal. Indeed, one of the critical weaknesses of the Oxford History is that it never
confronts head-on the fundamental racism embodied in the British Empire. As
Barbara Rush points out in Imperialism, Race and Resistance, racism grew stronger
in the early 20th century when the idea of “a white, imperial diaspora . . . was
energetically promoted”. White settlers, she argues, shared “a diasporic
consciousness, a common identity based on ‘Anglo-Saxon’ cultural roots, racial
superiority and a sense of ‘home’ as the imperial center”.9 Bush is concerned with
white, settler communities in Africa, but her comments apply also to the parts of the
British diaspora established in Canada, Australia and New Zealand. In these parts of
Greater Britain, having a white skin and British cultural roots (for those of Celtic
origins overseas were as much part of the dominant group as those with Anglo-Saxon
cultural roots) automatically gave one a privileged position both in the colony and in
the “mother country”. In practice Canada pursued an immigration policy virtually as
exclusive as the better known White Australia policy and in their attitudes towards
indigenous peoples the differences between the two countries were not nearly as great
as Canadians like to believe. Until the 1950s (even after the independence of India)
the British Commonwealth was essentially a white man’s club, based on an historic
9 Barbara Rush, Imperialism, Race and Resistance: Imperialism, Race, and Africa (London, 1999), 
p. 4.
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alliance between the British at home and the British overseas. The Cambridge History
was based upon the assumption that this was a good thing, a perspective which only
a very few now share, but at least it recognized the powerful appeal of what Canadian
historian Doug Cole years ago described as “the crimson thread of kinship”.
Unfortunately Doug Cole’s articles are today rarely read either by Imperial historians
or by Canadian historians.10
There is a second way in which Robinson and Gallagher shaped, and in my mind
seriously distorted, our study of British Imperial history. They popularized the
concept of  “informal empire”. This has always been a controversial concept. Andrew
Porter admits that it is very difficult to define the criteria which determine whether a
country or a region should or should not be included within Britain’s so-called
informal empire, but he still accepts – rather reluctantly one senses – that there was
an “intermediate category” of territories “best described as part of a British ‘informal
empire’” (III, pp. 8-9).  Yet none of the chapters in volume three which deal with the
concept of an informal empire give a convincing justification for this position. In
“British Policy, Trade and Informal Empire in the Mid-Nineteenth Century” Martin
Lynn is basically critical of the concept. Latin America is usually seen as the classic
example of British “informal empire”, but Alan Knight admits in the chapter on
“Britain and Latin America” that “Whether economic imbalance or cultural
dependency qualify as ‘imperialism’ is a moot theoretical point” (III, p. 125).
Although he believes in the utility of the concept, Knight’s chapter could as easily be
used to prove its essential disutility. Knight does not, for example, give any clear
justification for including much of South America in the British informal empire but
excluding Mexico where British consuls also frequently interfered in domestic
politics to protect British interests (see III, p. 132). And even if large “swathes” of the
economies of the various Latin American economies came under of the control of
British investors, can the British enclaves in Latin America really be compared with
the powerful British settler communities, even the numerically small ones, in all of the
colonies which were part of the formal Empire? Knight admits they can not (see III,
pp. 140-3). He also admits that it is impossible to distinguish what constitutes British
rather than simply more broadly European influences in Latin America. In his chapter
on “Britain and China” Jurgen Osterhammel is no more convincing. He does attempt
a definition of what constitutes an informal empire – interestingly one which would
rule out virtually all of Latin America (see III, pp. 148-9) – but he admits the
questionable use of the term when applied to mainland China and the difficulty of
isolating “the specifically British element” from that of the other powers involved in
the subjugation of China (III, p. 165).
What is problematic for the 19th century becomes increasingly absurd in the 20th.
The editor of volume four, Roger Louis, admits that “in the twentieth century the
hegemonic influence in Latin America was the United States” (IV, p. 40), but the
volume still includes a chapter on Latin America, in which Alan Knight shows that
the so-called “informal empire” in Latin America had come to an end well before the
10 Douglas Cole, “The Crimson Thread of Kinship: Ethnic Ideas in Australia, 1870-1914”, Historical
Studies, 14, 6 (April 1971), pp. 511-25 and “The Problem of Nationalism and Imperialism in British
Settlement Colonies”, Journal of British Studies, 10, 2 (May 1971), pp 160-82.
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Second World War, even in Argentina, where British investments were increasingly
concentrated. Jorgen Osterhammel argues that although America was rapidly
emerging as the dominant power in China, “it would be an exaggeration to speak of
an American informal empire”, although his reasons for a distinction of this kind are
less than convincing (IV, p. 644). The chapter on China in the 20th century seems
more concerned with Britain’s diplomatic relations with the mainland government
than with Hong Kong, which several hundred Canadians died defending in the Second
World War – precisely because it was part of the formal Empire.
Perhaps I am just being a parochial Canadian nationalist. But it does seem to me
that a history of the 19th- and 20th-century Empire suffers from a lack of geographical
balance when as much attention is given to Latin America and to China as to Canada
and more attention to Siam which was not part of the Empire than to the colony of
Newfoundland, which is dealt with in a few passing references. Call me old-fashioned
but I still believe that a history of the British Empire should focus on the parts of the
World which were part of the Empire rather than the parts that were not. I guess one
should be grateful. At least there is a whole chapter devoted to Canada in both the
third and fourth volumes of the Oxford History, whereas in the third volume Australia
becomes part of the Western Pacific and New Zealand just another of the Southern
Islands, and in the fourth volume the history of “Australia, New Zealand, and the
Pacific Islands” is summed up in one, brief chapter.
The “informal empire” concept is pernicious for another reason. It implies that
there is a continuum from colonies where Britain exercised full and effective
sovereignty to wholly independent states. From this perspective those settler colonies
which demanded and ultimately received the right to govern themselves were
obviously suffering from some form of retarded intellectual development since they
did not want to move further along the spectrum “towards decolonisation and full
nationhood”. The British settlers are presented as “ideal prefabricated
collaborators”,11 little different from collaborators elsewhere in the Empire.
Responsible government is seen not as a measure devised by the British colonists
overseas to give them control over their own affairs (as the authors of the Cambridge
History believed) but simply as another tool which could be used by the Imperial
Government for securing collaboration. Thus in the Oxford History the whole
question of the definition and extension of the system of responsible government in
British North America is relegated to a page in Peter Boroughs’ sweeping survey of
the “Institutions of Empire” and to two pages in Ged Martin’s “Canada from 1815”.
Nehru knew more about the rebellions of 1837 in the Canadas and the Durham Report
than anyone will learn from reading the Oxford History but then perhaps he read the
Cambridge History. He certainly read the Durham Report, as did generations of
colonial politicians. Yet there is no real discussion in the Oxford History of Durham’s
mission nor of the historiographical debate over the influence of his famous report,
although it remains probably the most widely circulated, widely read and influential
document in British Imperial history. Poor Robert Baldwin, one  of the great heroes
of the struggle for responsible government in the Cambridge History, does not even
11 The quote is from Ronald Robinson but is used approvingly by Ged Martin on III, p. 522.
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rate a separate reference in the index of the Oxford History!12 Damn clever those Brits
for coming up with a device which ensured colonial collaboration at a minimum of
cost and persuading the colonists to agree to it. This is revisionist history with a
vengeance. What disturbs me is not merely the interpretation but the way in which the
insights of several generations of scholars from Chester Martin to Nicholas Mansergh
are dismissed without even a serious discussion of the issues they raised. Perhaps I am
just being overly sensitive as my book on The Transition to Responsible Government
was also effectively ignored.13 I do not feel particularly slighted. The treatment of
Canada in the 19th-century volume is so brief it really could not seriously engage with
Canadian historiography on virtually any issue.
In his review of the Oxford History, Bernard Porter declares that “Canadians may
not appreciate Ged Martin’s delightfully skittish treatment of them in Volume
Three”.14 Indeed, the impression one takes away from Martin’s chapter is  that Canada
in the 19th century was a bleak and barren place with little land suitable for farming;
cities were slow to develop and those which did quickly reproduced the “horrors of
old-world disease and slums”; and “the absence of large-scale mineral resources”
meant that few fortunes could be made, which explains why there was “no Canadian
Cecil Rhodes” (III, p. 527). One wonders then at the stupidity of those hundreds of
thousands of British migrants who foolishly crossed the Atlantic to settle in this land
of limited and little opportunity. Many of them, of course, did not stay but there was
a tenfold increase in the Canadian population over the century. Martin dismisses this
increase as “scarcely impressive on an Imperial scale” (III, p. 527). Perhaps so but it
meant that by 1914 Canada had a larger population than either Scotland or Ireland, in
fact nearly as large a population as the two combined. The standard of living of
Canadians was rising and somehow they managed to find sufficient domestic savings
to finance industrial expansion after 1879 and the boom years after 1901 (see III, p.
529). If there was no Cecil Rhodes, there was a Samuel Cunard, founder of the famous
steamship line, a Lord Strathcona and Lord Mount Stephen, both of whom made huge
fortunes out of building the CPR, and a young but rising Max Aitken (soon to become
Lord Beaverbrook). After condemning the poor quality of Canadian politicians in the
19th century, Martin goes on to say that “The British governing elite knew little of
Canada, less of the Maritimes, and generally behaved with patronizing superiority
towards the colonials” (III, p. 528). Probably true, but why then go on to quote the
critical and condescending comments of colonial governors as if they were accurate
reflections of colonial reality? To be fair to Martin, part of the problem he faced was
one of space and, given the limitations under which he was working, his chapter is
well worth reading, especially the section dealing with the “British” identity of late-
19th-century Canadians. But part of the problem was also with his conception of
Canada as an intellectual and political backwater incapable of conforming “to a
decolonisation model of progression through stages of self-government to full
12 For a defence of this belief, see P.A. Buckner, “The Transition to Responsible Government: Some
Revisions in Need of Revising” in C.C. Eldridge, ed., From Rebellion to Patriation: Canada and
Britain in the Nineteenth and Twentienth Centuries ([Cardiff], 1989), pp. 1-25.
13 So forgive me for referring to it here: Phillip A. Buckner, The Transition to Responsible Government:
British Policy in British North America, 1815-1850 (Westport, Conn., 1985).
14 Bernard Porter, “An Awfully Big Colonial Adventure”, Times Literary Supplement, 14 January 2000.
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independence” (III, p. 537). Could it be that it is this model that is faulty?
Now Martin is certainly not alone in his interpretation. It is an appealing one to
those Australian, Canadian and New Zealand nationalists who see the imperial
connection as a long and unfortunate aberration and who wish to write the Empire out
of their histories. Yet in the 19th century a series of what James Belich has described
as neo-Britains came into existence, formed out of the successive waves of migrants
from the United Kingdom.15 Marjory Harper describes the forces which led to this
diaspora in her chapter on “British Migration and the Peopling of the Empire” and she
recognizes how significant emigration was in promoting imperial awareness in
Britain. But I am not convinced by her argument that by the end of the 19th century
“the imperialism which was often a crucial component of [the] migrants’ national
identity . . . may well have impeded their assimilation and the development of colonial
nationalism” (III, p. 86). Most of the children of earlier generations of British
migrants to the colonies of settlement did not see loyalty to their neo-Britain as
incompatible with loyalty to the land of their forebears. They had no difficulty in
holding multiple national identities. The British Empire continued to be unique among
the European empires (as the Cambridge History declared) because it created a series
of colonies, dominated by British migrants and their descendants, which became
independent in all but name but which remained willingly tied to the mother country.
The inhabitants of these neo-Britains would have found offensive the notion that they
were merely collaborators, for they thought of themselves as partners with the Britons
at home in the extension of British power around the globe. In volume four of the
Oxford History David MacKenzie declares that Canadians “had few dreams of
‘empire’ for themselves” (p. 576). That will come as news to the native peoples of the
Prairie West. Western expansion was an act of imperialism and the creation of the
North West Mounted Police and the building of the Canadian Pacific Railway were
instruments of maintaining imperial control, which only later became symbols of a
Canadian national identity. Canadians also participated in imperial expansion
elsewhere. There were Canadian-born Britons serving with the British forces in the
Crimea; one of the first medals awarded a Canadian overseas was a Toronto boy killed
in the charge of the Light Brigade. The first Black to be awarded a VC in the Royal
Navy was a Nova Scotian. Canadians spilt their blood for the Empire at Lucknow and
in various parts of Africa, most notably alongside their fellow Britons during the
South African War.16 There were also Canadian-born missionaries along side British
missionaries in Africa, the south Pacific and in China. And Canadian-born scientists,
engineers, miners, doctors and mineralogists wherever the British flag (which was
also of course the Canadian flag) flew. And what was true of Canadians was also true
15 James Belich, “Neo-Britains” (paper presented to the conference on “The British World: Diaspora,
Culture and Identity”, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, London, 9 August 1998). Unfortunately
Belich’s paper has not yet been published, but many of the ideas are developed in his Making Peoples:
A History of New Zealanders From Polynesian Settlement to the End of the Nineteenth Century
(Auckland, 1996) and Paradise Reforged: A History of the New Zealanders from the 1880s to the year
2000 (London, 2002).
16 See P.A. Buckner, “Canada” in David Omissi and Andrew Thompson, eds., The Impact of the South
African War (Basingstoke, U.K., 2002).
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of Australians, of New Zealanders, of English-speaking South Africans and of smaller
British minorities elsewhere. 
A famous imperial historian once said to me that imperial history must be about
the centre or it is not imperial history. But this centre-periphery concept is misleading
in the case of the British Empire in the 19th century. As James Belich has pointed out,
we need to begin thinking not of a single British metropolis but of a “globally-
scattered” metropolis, a trans-national cultural entity based upon a populist form of
pan-Britonism.17 In the Oxford History the flow of people, ideas and culture is viewed
not entirely but largely as a one-way flow, from the metropolis outward. Collectively
the authors seem to me to underestimate the impact of the empire – especially the
colonies of settlement – in shaping domestic institutions and life. They virtually
ignore, for example, the reverse flow of migrants from the colonies of settlements
back to Britain, a flow which included businessmen like Lord Strathcona and Lord
Beaverbrook, politicians like Andrew Bonar Law and Edward Blake, singers, writers
and a host of others. While writing this paper I happened to see a picture in the London
Independent of Maud Allen, a Canadian-born “exotic” dancer who became an
Edwardian sex symbol.18 The volumes of the Dictionary of Canadian Biography (and
the volumes of the Australian and New Zealand dictionaries of national biography)
give an indication of how significant this migration was and how influential it was in
helping to shape British imperial culture. Many more overseas Britons returned only
briefly, as tourists, but they did not feel they were visiting a foreign country, only
returning home. Others kept alive an association with the “old country” through the
tens of millions of letters which flowed back and forth across the oceans between the
Britons at home and the Britons overseas in the 19th century. Little of this dynamic
relationship between the mother country and the neo-Britains overseas comes across
in the Oxford History. There is a hint of it in John MacKenzie’s chapters but he is
primarily concerned with “metropolitan” culture and even he does not talk about the
relationship between the definition of British-ness at home and British-ness abroad.
Indeed, I did not find a single reference to the important theoretical articles on this
topic by the New Zealand-born J.G.A. Pocock, not even in the chapter on New
Zealand.19 The various Dominions are dealt with in separate chapters, without any
serious discussion of common themes, almost as if they were already separate nations
just waiting for the end of the imperial relationship. 
In the 20th-century volume there is at least some recognition that this is an
oversimplified model. Rob Holland recognizes the critical significance of the
Dominions during the First World War. He is not always surefooted on the details
relating to Canada, turning Henri Bourassa into a separatist and declaring that
Bourassa “displaced Laurier as the acknowledged leader of Quebec”, which ignores
the fact that it was Laurier who led the campaign against conscription in 1917 and
17 Belich, “Neo-Britains”.
18 Independent (London), 1 January 2000, “Weekend Review”, p. 11.
19 Pocock’s work was recently the focus of an AHR Forum on “The New British History in Atlantic
Perspective”, American Historical Review, 104, 2 (April 1999), pp. 426-500. Unfortunately the debate
focused almost entirely on the 17th and 18th centuries and on the Anglo-American relationship. For
my own effort to apply some of Pocock’s insights, see P.A. Buckner, “Whatever Happened to the
British Empire?”, Journal of the Canadian Historical Association, new series, 3 (1994), pp. 1-31.
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who remained the dominant Francophone politician (V, p. 126). But Holland deals
sensitively with the issue of nationalism, recognizing that the War “did not create a
Canadian, still less an Australian, identity that could be fully separated from the
matrix of the British Empire” (V, p. 133). One reason why Canadians did not evolve
a separate identity was, as John Darwin points out, that the model of Dominion status
seemed adequate to most Canadians. The flow of emigration from the British Isles to
the Dominions continued right up until the 1950s. Indeed, Gallup polls in Britain
between 1948 and 1957 showed that nearly 30 to 40 per cent of respondents wished
to emigrate, the vast majority of them to the Dominions (V, p. 168). Ironically, the
20th century also saw a heavy return migration of British migrants and their
descendants; the census of 1931 counted 92,745 people born in the Dominions
resident in Britain, many of them highly talented individuals attracted by
opportunities at the centre of their imperial world (V, p. 176). An increasingly
complex web of institutions bound this “British” world together. And in the Second
World War, as in the First, the British in the Dominions rallied to the support of their
Motherland. Yet curiously the tone of much of volume four might lead one to think
differently. In his very fine study John Mackenzie talks of an “Indian Summer in the
popular culture of Empire” (V, p. 229). It may have been an Indian Summer but it was
not apparent to those who lived at the time. Indeed, the whole discussion of
decolonization has a strongly teleological tone to it. The First World War delays it,
then the Great Depression delays it, then the Second World War delays it. And even
then it takes another two decades for the Canadians, Australians and New Zealanders
to wake up. Slow learners, these colonials! Moreover, when they finally see the
writing on the wall, they are persuaded to remain part of an expanded British
Commonwealth of Nations, created by the British Government as an instrument for
perpetuating British informal influence over its former colonies. Put simplistically,
this appears to be the essence of the argument advanced in the Oxford History.
The Cambridge History of the British Empire accepted as a given that Canadians,
Australians, New Zealanders and English-speaking South Africans were co-owners of
the British Empire and its history. The Oxford History of the British Empire
essentially rejects that claim. It sees the British overseas as colonials rather than as
imperialists. In virtually every respect the Oxford History of the British Empire is far
more sophisticated, far more balanced and nuanced, and far more satisfying than the
Cambridge History. But in this one area the Cambridge History may have been closer
to getting it right than the Oxford History, even if it did so for the wrong reasons. I am
not making some nostalgic lament for the world we have lost nor arguing that the
relationship between Britain and the neo-Britains overseas was the only significant
aspect of Britain’s imperial past. But this relationship was a crucial part of the history
of the Empire.
But if the Oxford History is to be criticized for downplaying the significance of the
Dominions to the Empire, contemporary Canadian (and Australian and New Zealand)
historians must accept some responsibility for encouraging them to do so. In an
interesting change of heart, Canadian historians no longer want to share in Britain’s
imperial past. Thus in his chapter on “Canada, the North Atlantic Triangle and the
Empire”, David Mackenzie sees the imperial connection as simply an aspect of “the
larger, triangular relationship between Britain, the United States, and Canada” (IV, p.
575). Canadians’ commitment to the Empire is seen in purely strategic terms –
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“playing up Canada’s ‘Britishness’ to deflect American intrusions, or emphasizing
Canada’s ‘American heritage’ to combat Imperial centralizers” (IV, p. 575).
Gradually, the balance of forces in the triangle shifted and inevitably Canada had
perforce to accept that Britain could no longer play its role and Canada moved out of
Britain’s formal empire and became part of America’s informal empire. MacKenzie
argues his case effectively and it is line with most of the recent liberal nationalist
scholarship. So too is the article by Doug Owram in volume five of the Oxford History
on the historiography of “Canada and the Empire”. After a quick survey of the earlier
scholarship, Owram declares that by the 1960s the study of Canada and the Empire
had become a specialized field of little interest to most Canadian historians, except
those who were born and made their living outside of Canada (I guess that leaves me
out which may be why he also ignores my Presidential Address to the Canadian
Historical Association on this subject).20 The focus of real Canadian historians has
been on the broader field of international relations rather than Commonwealth or
imperial studies (V, p. 159). Owram admits that there is some interest in the topic of
immigration, of “how the British adjusted, or failed to adjust to their new homeland”
but he does not see this as essentially an imperial theme. And he admits that there is
some interest in studying Imperialism as a form of Canadian nationalism à la Carl
Berger. But the notion of ‘empire’ in Canada, he declares, has always been bilateral
and the true concern of Canadian historians should be not with imperial history but
with “the origin of Canada” (V, p. 161). In any event the historiography of empire in
Canada is “in reality only partly about Empire” (in which Canadians were obviously
not interested per se) but primarily about what was Canada’s “main link to the wider
world” (V, p. 162).
This is a comforting approach for Canadian nationalists, who prefer that Canadians
be thought of as part of the colonized rather than as part of the colonizers. In fact, as
every member of a First Nation is only too well aware, it is also patently absurd. True
decolonization has not and never will take place in Canada, any more than in the
United States and it is profoundly ahistorical to pretend that Canadians were passive
rather than active imperialists. Indeed, Canadians were late converts to the notion of
turning the “British” commonwealth into a multinational commonwealth. Canada did
not endorse the grant of Dominion Status to India until after World War Two and then
only grudgingly. It did not speak out against South Africa until the 1960s. Doug
Owram may believe it is the duty of historians to create national myths; I believe it is
our duty to confront them. But I agree with his general argument about the lack of
interest of Canadian historians in the imperial connection. The irony, of course, is that
by denying the Empire’s significance in Canadian history, they are also denying
Canada’s significance to the Empire, ensuring that Canadian history is studied almost
entirely within Canada and by Canadians, and justifying the kind of treatment which
it receives in the Oxford History.
PHILLIP A. BUCKNER
20 See Buckner, “Whatever Happened to the British Empire?”
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